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CLASS ACTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF ERIE  
In the 2010 case Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 a divided Supreme Court issued 
a plurality opinion that sparked new debate about the role of 
the Erie doctrine, viewed through the lens of divergent national 
and state rules regarding class action certification. The 1938 
landmark case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 gave rise to the 
Erie doctrine, which—to address federalism concerns—offers a 
solution to choice-of-law conflicts between federal and state 
rules in diversity suits. The Erie doctrine is particularly 
important where variance between national and state laws 
could result in different litigation outcomes depending on the 
particular rule applied. At first glance, the Erie doctrine 
appears to be a straightforward rule. In order to prevent forum 
shopping and an inequitable distribution of the laws,3 “federal 
courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and 
federal procedural law.”4  
Despite its seeming simplicity, the Erie doctrine leads to 
numerous complications for a variety of reasons. The 
Constitution recognizes both the federal government and state 
governments as sovereign in their respective territories, with 
the federal government having ultimate supremacy.5 Both the 
  
 1 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 3 For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, including its “twin aims” of preventing (1) 
forum shopping and (2) an inequitable distribution of the laws, see infra Part II. 
 4 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) 
(“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive 
and federal procedural law.”); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 5 See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
In Erie, the Supreme Court explained: 
[The Constitution] recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence 
of the States—independence in their legislative and . . . in their judicial 
departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of 
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states and the federal government are authorized to create 
laws dealing with procedural processes and substantive issues, 
but the line between substance and procedure is not always 
distinct.6 Moreover, the United States legal system recognizes 
the authority of both statutory and common law, and judicial 
commentary on congressional legislation sheds light on the 
meaning of statutory rules and standards. However, for federal 
courts sitting in diversity, the Erie doctrine states that only 
federal rules stemming from the Constitution or congressional 
legislation preempt state law.7 Therefore, in cases heard under 
diversity jurisdiction, federal common law “has been eliminated 
as a source of substantive rights for claims based on state law.”8 
Because of the multiple and often overlapping layers of 
authority in American jurisprudence, the application of the 
Erie doctrine can become a complex endeavor for federal courts.  
Class-action certification illustrates the complexity 
between the applicability of federal laws to the issue at hand 
and the substance/procedure dichotomy. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure Rule 23 governs class action certification, a 
necessary procedural step in pursuing a class action.9 In theory, 
  
the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution 
specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference 
with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the 
State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence. 
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 6 For a discussion of the dichotomy between substance and procedure, see 
infra Part III.  
 7 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, 
Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie 
Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 737 (2006) (“Most conflicts between state and federal law 
are not even conceived of as Erie problems, but simply as routine issues under the 
Supremacy Clause. If the Constitution determines an issue, as it does the right to jury 
trial in federal court, then state law must give way. So, too, federal legislation, so long 
as it is constitutional, has the same preemptive effect on state law . . . .”). 
 8 Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 737; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 
(“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a 
state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general’ . . . . And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”); infra Part II 
(discussing the development of the Erie jurisprudence). 
 9 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:  
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
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class actions promote efficiency by offering a procedural 
mechanism for parties to aggregate claims.10 For example, when 
a court certifies a plaintiff class,11 plaintiffs can pool—and 
courts can conserve—their resources, and defendants can avoid 
the burdens of defending against multiple lawsuits (including 
discovery costs).12 However, states also have laws regulating 
the certification of class actions. Because of the lucrative 
nature of class actions, particularly for plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
states have passed varying laws regarding class action 
certification.13 Some states have laws that are more plaintiff-
friendly, while other states, such as New York, have laws that 
are more restrictive of class certification.14 
In the 1970s, New York passed section 901 of the New 
York Civil Practice Law to limit the enormous rewards often 
granted to plaintiffs in class actions.15 Section 901(a) largely 
  
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is 
satisfied and if:  
. . . 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that 
a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: 
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation 
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the 
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 10 Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action 
Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1793 n.1 (2009); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (stating that class actions 
are procedural aggregation devices that do not change the rights of litigants). 
 11 Although defendants may also pursue class certification, it is a mechanism 
more often employed by plaintiffs. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) [hereinafter CAFA], see 
infra Part IV.A. Congress enacted CAFA largely because of vastly divergent state laws 
regarding class certification that led to abuse by plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
 12 York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1799. 
 13 For a discussion of the legislative history of CAFA, see infra Part IV.A  
 14 See infra Part IV.A. 
 15 Section 901 of New York State Civil Practice law provides: 
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all if: 
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise 
required or permitted, is impracticable; 
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members; 
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parallels the language of Rule 23,16 but section 901(b) 
additionally states, “Unless a statute creating or imposing a 
penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically 
authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to 
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or 
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.”17 
Thus, section 901(b) prevents certification of suits where 
plaintiffs seek solely to recover a “penalty.”  
In 2005, Congress attempted to bring increasingly 
common nationwide class actions under federal jurisdiction 
with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).18 Congress wanted 
to address the consequences of multistate class actions on 
interstate commerce and the perceived abuses in class-action-
friendly states, where plaintiffs’ lawyers manipulated the class 
mechanism to pressure defendants into settlement.19 Through 
CAFA, Congress gave federal jurisdiction to most nationwide 
class actions.20 CAFA permits plaintiffs to file any class action 
in federal court (or defendants to remove any class action to 
federal court) if (1) minimum diversity requirements are met 
and (2) the amount in controversy aggregates to at least $5 
million.21 Thus, Congress expanded diversity jurisdiction for 
class actions, most notably by eliminating the requirement of 
complete diversity. Even when class-action claims arise under 
  
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class; 
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class; and 
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy. 
b. Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of 
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an 
action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or 
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2010). 
 16 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 22 (2010) (“New York law includes 
a provision specifically addressing the availability of statutory-penalty or minimum-
damage remedies in a class proceeding, which was enacted when New York updated its 
general class action provision following the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 23.”). 
 17 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b). 
 18 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
 19 See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text. 
 20 York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1804. 
 21 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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state law, CAFA permits federal courts to hear those claims.22 
Recently, in Shady Grove, the Supreme Court analyzed 
whether Rule 23 and section 901(b) could coexist in New York 
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear class actions under 
CAFA.23 The question before the court was, “if state law 
assesses the propriety of a class action differently than a 
federal court would, when (if ever) must the federal court follow 
state law rather than the prevailing federal approach?”24 
This note argues that the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals and Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Shady Grove 
correctly concluded that section 901 can coexist with Rule 23.25 
Indeed, Section 901 does not directly conflict with Rule 23 
because section 901 imposes procedural limits on New York legal 
remedies, a substantive interest that belongs under state 
jurisdiction.26 This note follows Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and 
proposes that, in light of the Shady Grove decision, Congress 
should rewrite CAFA to preserve its original aim of controlling 
ballooning class-action litigation while still respecting states’ 
rights to govern their laws. As Justice Ginsburg suggested, 
Congress should amend CAFA by adding a provision that 
prevents federal courts from certifying state-law class actions 
that could not be brought in state courts.27 This proposal stays 
true to the legislative intent behind CAFA by permitting states, 
as well as the federal government, to enact policies that curb 
class action abuse.28 The proposal also comports with many other 
CAFA carve-outs in which local interests supersede CAFA’s 
  
 22 Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules 
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1132 (2011). See 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
 23 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1436 (2010). 
 24 Steinman, supra note 22, at 1132. 
 25 See id. at 1143 (“Shady Grove became a 5-4 decision . . . because only four 
Justices (led by Justice Ginsburg) were able to reconcile Federal Rule 23 and § 901(b). 
For Justice Scalia and the majority, the conflict between Federal Rule 23 and § 901(b) 
was unavoidable.” (footnote omitted)). 
 26 For a discussion of the substantive nature of statutory damages, see infra 
Part III.D; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses 
of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1925 (2006) (“Because avowedly 
procedural rules may have either substantive purposes or substantive effects, 
consideration should be given to the political legitimacy of the process by which they 
are formulated or applied and of the actors who are formulating or applying them. 
Rather than giving up on the procedure/substance dichotomy, we should craft it with 
attention to its ultimately political ramifications.”). 
 27 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 28 See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.  
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grant of federal jurisdiction.29 This proposal acknowledges the 
inherent substantive state interests in regulating class actions 
arising under state law. It discourages vertical forum shopping 
and helps to ensure an equitable application of the law in both 
federal and state courts.30 Moreover, the proposal does not 
permit a federal rule to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive 
state right.31 Part I of this note will discuss the background and 
facts of Shady Grove. Part II will explain the Erie doctrine, the 
development of Erie jurisprudence, and applicable limitations on 
state legislatures. Part III will analyze the Supreme Court’s 
error in failing to apply the correct Erie analysis in Shady Grove. 
Finally, Part IV will suggest a solution to the Supreme Court’s 
flawed analysis in Shady Grove by proposing that Congress 
amend CAFA to prevent similar mistakes and to affirm state 
sovereignty. 
I. SHADY GROVE: BACKGROUND AND FACTS  
In Shady Grove, Sonia Galvez received treatment from 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, located in Maryland, for 
her injuries resulting from a car accident.32 Allstate Insurance 
Company insured Galvez, and her policy, issued in New York, 
was governed by New York law.33 The cause of action in Shady 
Grove arose out of New York Insurance Law section 5106(a), 
which provides statutory interest on overdue benefits.34 Under 
section 5106(a), once Shady Grove filed Galvez’s claim with 
Allstate, the insurance company had thirty days to pay the 
claim or deny it.35 Although Allstate eventually paid Shady 
Grove, Allstate did not timely do so, and statutory interest (at a 
rate of two percent a month) accrued on the overdue benefit.36 
Shady Grove could have individually pursued a claim for the 
interest against Allstate in New York state court. However, 
section 901(b), with its provision preventing the use of class 
  
 29 For a discussion of the carve-outs in the Class Action Fairness Act, see 
infra Part IV.C. 
 30 See infra Part II for a discussion of the “twin aims” of Erie: (1) to 
discourage forum shopping; and (2) to avoid the inequitable administration of the laws.  
 31 For a discussion of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), see 
infra Part II. 
 32 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. (noting that under New York law, Allstate had thirty days to pay or 
deny the claim once Shady Grove submitted it). 
 36 Id.  
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actions to pursue statutory damages,37 forced the Shady Grove 
plaintiffs to pursue their class-wide claim in federal court.38 
Shady Grove’s individual claims totaled only $500, but the 
aggregated claims of all similarly situated plaintiffs totaled 
over $5 million.39 Therefore, the Shady Grove plaintiffs met the 
minimal diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements to 
file the suit in federal court under CAFA.40 The District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the suit, 
reasoning that Shady Grove was precluded from bringing a 
class action by section 901(b).41 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the Eastern District’s holding, noting that no conflict 
existed between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and section 
901(b) “because they address different issues.”42 The Second 
Circuit held that Rule 23 controls the criteria for class 
certification, whereas section 901(b) governs the threshold 
question of “whether the particular type of claim is eligible for 
class treatment in the first place—a question on which Rule 23 
is silent.”43 Like the Eastern District, the Second Circuit held 
that section 901(b) is substantive rather than procedural, and 
therefore federal courts sitting in diversity had to apply it 
under the Erie doctrine.44 
The Supreme Court overturned both lower courts’ 
analyses. In a plurality opinion,45 the Supreme Court declared 
section 901(b) to be a procedural rule in direct conflict with 
Rule 23. The Court first held that Rule 23 governed class 
certification, a procedural mechanism, for federal courts sitting 
in diversity.46 In his analysis, Justice Scalia ignored the 
substantive implications of rules governing class action 
certification47 and found that if Rule 23 requirements are met, 
  
 37 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2010). 
 38 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
 39 Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 40 Id. at 1436-37 (majority opinion). 
 41 Id. at 1437. 
 42 Id. at 1438. For a discussion of the substantive nature of section 901(b) that 
could be incorporated into a federal court’s interpretation of Rule 23, see infra Part III.D. 
 43 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438. 
 44 Id. at 1437. 
 45 Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, and Chief Justice Roberts joined 
Justice Scalia’s opinion; Justice Stevens concurred in judgment, and thus a majority of 
the Court stated that Rule 23, not section 901(b), governed class action certification 
procedures in New York federal courts sitting in diversity. Justice Ginsburg wrote the 
dissent, joined by Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. See id. at 1435. 
 46 Id. at 1448. 
 47 For a discussion of the substantive issues underlying class actions, see 
infra Parts III.D and IV.A. 
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then federal courts must certify classes.48 Justice Stevens, 
concurring in the judgment, reached the same conclusion as 
Justice Scalia, although he advocated for a nuanced, case-by-
case analysis of federal rules by using a balancing test that 
would “not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue 
takes the form of what is traditionally described as substantive 
or procedural. Rather, it [would turn] on whether the state law 
actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or 
remedies.”49 The plurality did not address the fact that Shady 
Grove was in federal court only because of the jurisdictional 
grant in CAFA. The Shady Grove decision distorted the intent 
of CAFA and expanded the right of plaintiffs to pursue class 
actions arising under a single state’s laws in federal court.50 
Additionally, Shady Grove increased the power of the federal 
government to hear class actions arising under state law at the 
expense of the state’s substantive interest to curb the 
certification of damage classes, which are classes formed to 
obtain solely monetary relief.51 
II. FEDERALISM: THE RULES OF DECISION ACT, THE RULES 
ENABLING ACT, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ERIE 
JURISPRUDENCE  
The conflicting interpretations given to the meaning of 
Rule 23 and section 901(b) by the Supreme Court and the New 
York federal courts reflect a longstanding choice-of-law 
problem for federal courts in the American system. Diversity 
jurisdiction,52 which allows federal courts to hear claims arising 
under state laws, creates a situation where federal courts must 
decide whether to apply state or federal laws, including 
procedural and common law rules. In Erie Railroad Co. v. 
  
 48 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439. 
 49 Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 50 One of the reasons Congress expanded federal jurisdiction under CAFA 
was to prevent states from certifying and deciding nationwide or multistate class 
actions, thereby binding other states and creating federalism concerns. For a 
discussion of CAFA’s legislative history, see infra Part IV.A. 
 51 See infra Part IV.A. While Congress intended to increase the power of the 
federal government to hear class action disputes through CAFA, it did so because 
plaintiff friendly states were too easily certifying classes, leading to a variety of 
problems. CAFA was not passed out of concern that some states limited the ability to 
pursue class actions for certain claims. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005: Findings and Purposes of CAFA, in 1 LITIGATING TORT CASES 
§ 9:28 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2010); see also infra Part 
III (discussing the substantive interest behind state limitations on statutory damages). 
 52 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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Tompkins,53 the Supreme Court, in deciding whether to apply the 
Pennsylvania or the federal common law standard in evaluating 
the duty owed to trespassers, addressed the choice-of-law issue 
in diversity suits.54 With deference to underlying principles of 
federalism and separation of powers,55 the Erie Court applied the 
Pennsylvania standard and held, “Except in matters governed 
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be 
applied in any case is the law of the State.”56 As interpreted in 
subsequent decisions, the Erie doctrine differentiated between 
substantive and procedural rules.57 The Erie Court permitted 
federal courts to apply federal procedural rules, but it declared 
the end of federal substantive common law for courts hearing a 
matter under diversity jurisdiction.58  
In explicating this decision, the Erie Court sought to 
address two major problems inherent within the applicability 
of divergent federal and state laws in diversity jurisdiction (the 
“twin aims” of Erie). First, Erie attempts to prevent the 
inequitable distribution of laws between citizens and 
noncitizens of a state. Under diversity jurisdiction, noncitizen 
plaintiffs have the privilege to pursue their state-law claims in 
state or federal courts (depending on the favorableness of 
applicable rules), which gives noncitizens an option not available 
to state-law litigants who are citizens of the state in which the 
action is brought.59 The second aim of Erie seeks to prevent 
vertical forum shopping, which occurs when noncitizen plaintiffs 
elect to bring a claim in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction, because the federal court’s rules are more 
favorable.60 Fundamentally, “The Erie rule is rooted in part in a 
  
 53 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 54 Id. at 70.  
 55 Id. at 78; see also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. 
L. REV. 693, 706 & n.77 (1974). 
 56 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 57 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); 
see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between 
state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can 
make substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional 
legislative powers in this regard.”). See infra Part III (discussing the 
substance/procedure dichotomy). 
 58 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“There is no federal general common law.”). 
 59 Id. at 74-77. 
 60 Id. Vertical forum shopping occurs when plaintiffs choose to pursue their 
claims in federal court instead of state court, depending on the favorability of 
applicable rules. In contrast, CAFA purported to prevent horizontal forum shopping, 
whereby plaintiffs would choose to bring their claims among various states, again 
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realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a 
litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought 
in a federal court.”61 Through this allocation of power between 
the federal and state governments, the Erie doctrine “implicates, 
indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our federalism.”62 
Two federal statutes play essential roles in Erie 
jurisprudence and further explicate the applicable law for 
diversity actions.63 The first is the Rules of Decision Act (RDA),64 
which was originally a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and 
was the basis of the Court’s holding in Erie.65 The Rules of 
Decision Act states, “The laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts 
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.”66 The Rules of Decision Act 
applies in situations where there is no federal constitutional or 
statutory rule that governs the issue at hand. Like the Erie 
doctrine itself, it prevents federal courts sitting in diversity 
from creating a federal substantive “common law” that could 
supersede state authority.67 Because “this restraint serves a 
policy of prime importance to our federal system,”68 the 
Supreme Court has often “applied the [Rules of Decision] Act 
‘with an eye alert to . . . avoiding disregard of State law.’”69  
The second federal statute of importance to the Erie 
doctrine is the 1934 Rules Enabling Act (REA),70 in which 
Congress delegated to the Supreme Court71 “the power to 
  
depending on the favorability of state law. For a discussion of horizontal forum 
shopping, see infra Part IV.A. 
 61 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467. 
 62 Ely, supra note 55, at 695. 
 63 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1460-61 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 64 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 65 Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-72 (citing the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 
1789, c. 20, 28 U.S.C. § 725). 
 66 28 U.S.C. § 1652. 
 67 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Erie, 
304 U.S. at 78). 
 68 Id. at 1461. 
 69 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 
110 (1945)). 
 70 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
 71 See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 738-39 (“A federal statute requires 
affirmative action by both houses of Congress while a federal rule does not. . . . All that is 
required for a federal rule to take effect is a failure by Congress to act. The actual drafting of 
the rules is undertaken by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Standing 
Committee on Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, whose proposals are submitted for 
approval to the Judicial Conference and then to the Supreme Court.”). 
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prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases 
in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals”72 
so long as these rules do “not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”73 This limitation is important, because the 
Constitution grants Congress—not the Supreme Court—the 
authority to make law.74 The Rules Enabling Act restricts the 
Court to enacting procedural, but not substantive, provisions.75 
The Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.76 In Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co.,77 the Supreme Court articulated the relevant 
analysis to determine the scope of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure in light of the restrictions against “abridg[ing], 
enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] any substantive right.”78 It held that 
“[t]he test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized 
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them.”79 Ultimately, when 
determining whether to follow federal or state law, federal 
courts sitting in diversity follow either the Rules of Decision 
Act (if there is no federal provision on point) or the Rules 
Enabling Act (if there is an applicable federal provision).80  
In Hanna v. Plumer,81 the Supreme Court attempted to 
clarify the interplay among the Erie doctrine, the Rules of 
Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act in diversity actions. 
The issue in Hanna involved a conflict between Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) and a Massachusetts state law, which 
provided different mechanisms for proper service of process.82 
Because a federal procedural rule, passed pursuant to the 
Rules Enabling Act, governed the issue in Hanna, the Court 
upheld the federal rule over the state rule.83 Unlike Erie, the 
  
 72 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). 
 73 Id. § 2072(b). 
 74 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
 75 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
 76 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1461 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 77 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 78 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (“In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress 
authorized this Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, but with 
the limitation that those rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))). 
 79 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
 80 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442. 
 81 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 82 Id. at 461-62. 
 83 Id. at 463-64. 
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federal rule at issue in Hanna was not derived from the 
common law. The Hanna Court concluded that the supremacy 
of federal constitutional and statutory law, unlike the federal 
common law at issue in Erie, mandated that federal courts, 
even when sitting in diversity and hearing a case arising under 
state law, apply the conflicting federal provision.84 Federalism 
inherently leads to some divergence between federal and state 
law, and the Court stated, “To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode 
of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either 
the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or 
Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”85  
Hanna established a two-prong choice-of-law test for 
federal courts sitting in diversity. Under the test, the threshold 
question for the court is whether there is a federal 
constitutional or statutory mandate or rule of civil procedure 
that governs the dispute.86 If there is, then the court follows the 
Hanna prong and applies the federal provision unless it is 
unconstitutional or otherwise limited; Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure cannot violate the Rules Enabling Act by abridging, 
enlarging, or modifying a substantive state right.87 Congress 
has the power to prescribe procedural rules for federal courts, 
even if they may sometimes differ from the rules used in state 
courts.88 The Hanna prong accepts the inequitable distribution 
of laws and forum shopping as inevitable consequences of a 
federal system in which the national government has ultimate 
supremacy over the states.89  
On the other hand, if there is no federal provision 
governing the dispute, then the court follows the “unguided 
Erie” prong,90 governed by the Rules of Decision Act and the 
Erie doctrine.91 Under this test, the court will apply federal 
  
 84 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473; U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 85 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74. 
 86 Id. at 471-72; Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010). 
 87 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see also id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“If a Federal Rule controls an issue and directly conflicts with state law, the Rule, so long as 
it is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act, applies in diversity suits.”). 
 88 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473. 
 89 Id. at 473-74. 
 90 Id. at 471. 
 91 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If . . . no 
Federal Rule or statute governs the issue, the Rules of Decision Act, as interpreted in 
Erie, controls. That Act directs federal courts, in diversity cases, to apply state law 
when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and yield markedly disparate 
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rules that are “procedural” and state rules that are 
“substantive,” giving deference to state provisions that involve 
specific state interests that extend beyond procedural 
regulation.92 If a court’s decision might violate or undermine the 
twin aims of Erie, then the court must follow the state law.93 
Therefore, a conflict between a state law and a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure, created through the Rules Enabling Act, 
involves a different analysis than that of an unguided choice 
mandated by the Erie doctrine.94 The Hanna Court explained 
the differences between the two tests: 
It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, 
that federal courts are to apply state “substantive” law and federal 
“procedural” law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are 
identical. For they were designed to control very different sorts of 
decisions. When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, 
the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively 
unguided Erie Choice: the court has been instructed to apply the 
Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if . . . this Court, and 
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in 
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor 
constitutional restrictions.95 
Despite the Hanna Court’s attempt at explaining the 
difference in analysis between an unguided Erie decision and 
one involving the application of a federal rule under the Hanna 
prong, “precise guidance has been lacking for both the ‘twin 
aims’ standard that governs unguided Erie choices and the 
[Rules Enabling Act]’s substantive-rights provision that 
governs the validity of a Federal Rule.”96 At least in theory, the 
unguided Erie prong and the Hanna prong restrict federal 
encroachment of state substantive law.97 Still, the Supreme 
Court has never held that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
  
litigation outcomes.” (citations omitted)); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-74; Steinman, supra 
note 22, at 1134-35. 
 92 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72. 
 93 See supra note 91; see also supra notes 3-4. 
 94 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-71. 
 95 Id. at 471. 
 96 Steinman, supra note 22, at 1136. 
 97 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1463 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[B]oth before and after Hanna, the above-
described decisions show, federal courts have been cautioned by this Court to 
‘interpre[t] the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests’ and a 
will ‘to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.’” (quoting Gasperini v. 
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 & 438 n.22 (1996))); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 
468 (“Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations not likely to raise the sort of 
equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to 
influence the choice of a forum.”). 
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violated the REA.98 Because the application of the Hanna prong 
usually leads to the application of the federal rule, and the Erie 
prong usually leads to the application of the state rule, these 
tests may lead to vertical forum shopping, a problem the Erie 
doctrine attempted to prevent.99 For example, a party that 
seeks the application of a federal rule may choose to bring the 
action in federal court (or remove) and argue under Hanna that 
the federal rule governs the issue at hand. On the other hand, 
a party that seeks the application of a state rule will bring the 
action in state court, where the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure cannot reach. If that action is removed to federal 
court, then the party that seeks application of the state rule 
will argue that the applicable federal rule is not broad enough 
to govern the issue. Therefore, federalism concerns arise in 
choice-of-law decisions for federal courts sitting in diversity.  
In her dissent in Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg 
articulated a nuanced analysis of the choice-of-law decisions by 
emphasizing the importance of federalism principles. Like the 
Hanna court, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the 
threshold issue in determining whether to follow the Hanna 
prong or the unguided Erie prong is whether there is an 
applicable federal rule on point.100 However, Justice Ginsburg 
did not entirely separate the RDA from the REA. She pointed 
out that both play integral roles when federal courts choose the 
appropriate route. Justice Ginsburg explained, “Recognizing 
that the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act 
simultaneously frame and inform the Erie analysis, we have 
endeavored in diversity suits to remain safely within the 
bounds of both congressional directives.”101  
Despite the Hanna Court’s attempt to offer a two-
pronged analysis for choice-of-law decisions and despite the 
extensive analysis given to the Erie doctrine in numerous 
  
 98 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-43 (“[W]e have rejected every 
statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us. We have found to be in 
compliance with § 2072(b) rules prescribing methods for serving process, and requiring 
litigants whose mental or physical condition is in dispute to submit to examinations. 
Likewise, we have upheld rules authorizing imposition of sanctions upon those who file 
frivolous appeals, or who sign court papers without a reasonable inquiry into the facts 
asserted. Each of these rules had some practical effect on the parties’ rights, but each 
undeniably regulated only the process for enforcing those rights; none altered the 
rights themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the court 
adjudicated either.” (citations omitted)). 
 99 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 100 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 101 Id. (citations omitted). For a discussion on how state interests can inform a 
federal court’s interpretation of the federal rules, see infra Parts III.C-D. 
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judicial opinions, choice-of-law problems persist for two main 
reasons. First, a federal rule’s applicability to an issue is not 
always clear.102 As Justice Ginsburg noted, federalism concerns 
have led courts to follow the Hanna prong only if they find 
“direct collision” between a federal rule and state law.103 Courts 
may subjectively apply a broad reading to a federal rule in 
order to enlarge its application, or give a narrow reading to a 
federal rule in order to limit its application.104 If the court gives 
a narrow reading to the federal rule at issue and determines it 
does not apply to the facts of the case, then the court must 
enter unguided Erie territory, where it must distinguish 
between “substantive” and “procedural” rules (while 
maintaining a preference for application of the state rule 
consistent with the twin aims of Erie).105 This subjectivity can 
lead to inconsistent application of the Hanna and Erie prongs, 
which can lead to a lack of uniformity and predictability in the 
law. The Erie doctrine itself leads to the second main problem: 
the line between “substantive” and “procedural” law is often 
blurry and is far from a bright-line test.106 In fact, the 
distinction between “substance” and “procedure” varies with 
the circumstances and facts of each case.107  
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO APPLY ERIE 
CORRECTLY IN SHADY GROVE 
The Shady Grove plurality opinion misapplied Hanna, 
because (1) Rule 23 and section 901(b) do not directly conflict; 
and (2) section 901(b)’s statutory limits on penalties are 
  
 102 A broad or narrow reading of a federal rule can complicate its applicability 
at hand. Like the difference between “substance” and “procedure,” a Federal Rule’s 
applicability or lack thereof to the facts at hand is not clear-cut. Cf. Shady Grove, 130 
S. Ct. at 1461-63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (analyzing various cases where the court 
permitted seemingly contradictory federal and state rules to coexist). 
 103 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980) (quoting Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)). 
 104 Id. at 749-50 (“The first question must therefore be whether the scope of 
the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It is 
only if that question is answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis applies.”). 
 105 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 194 
(2004) (“‘The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy,’ . . . ‘but no one 
doubts federal power over procedure.’” (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 
92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring))).  
 107 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (“The line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ 
shifts as the legal context changes. ‘Each implies different variables depending upon 
the particular problem for which it is used.’” (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 
99, 108 (1945))). 
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substantive, not procedural. Because Rule 23 and section 
901(b) do not directly collide, the Court should have followed 
the unguided Erie prong and applied section 901(b) out of 
deference to New York state sovereignty under the Rules of 
Decision Act and the Erie doctrine. By applying Rule 23 instead 
of section 901(b), the Court exacerbated the problems that the 
twin aims of Erie attempted to prevent; the decision will lead to 
the inequitable distribution of laws and vertical forum 
shopping. Moreover, even if the Court was correct in applying 
the Hanna prong because it rightly determined that Rule 23 
governed the issue at hand and directly collided with section 
901(b), it failed to acknowledge that section 901(b) is a 
substantive rule. Thus, even under the Hanna prong, the Court 
still should have applied section 901(b) over Rule 23 based on 
the REA’s command that federal procedural rules may not 
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any [state] substantive right[s].”108  
A. Justice Scalia’s Misapplication of the Hanna Prong in 
Shady Grove 
In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion, 
explained the Court’s approach in dealing with a potential 
conflict between a federal rule and a state rule. Justice Scalia 
followed the standard framework for a choice of law decision for 
federal courts sitting in diversity. He first asked whether Rule 
23 governed the issue.109 He noted that, under the Hanna prong, 
if Rule 23 were broad enough to cover the issue, then the Court 
would have to apply it, despite a conflicting New York law, 
unless the rule violated the Constitution or exceeded 
congressional authorization under the Rules Enabling Act.110 In 
addressing the mandate to avoid abridging, modifying, or 
enlarging state substantive rights, Justice Scalia wrote,  
The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive 
rights; most procedural rules do. What matters is what the rule itself 
regulates: If it governs only the manner and means by which the 
litigants’ rights are enforced, it is valid; if it alters the rules of 
decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights, it is not.111  
  
 108 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 109 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1437 (2010). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 1442 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court must analyze 
the substantive or procedural aspect of the federal, not state, 
rule at issue.112 He explained, “the validity of a Federal Rule 
depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure. If it 
does, it is authorized by [the Rules Enabling Act] and is valid 
in all jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless of its 
incidental effect upon state-created rights.”113 Based on the test, 
Justice Scalia concluded that Rule 23 is validly within the 
Rules Enabling Act, because class actions, like traditional 
joinder, simply provide a means for multiple parties to 
aggregate claims.114 However, Justice Scalia did not find that 
class actions change parties’ legal rights and duties or alter 
rules of decision.115 Thus, even though the amount at stake for 
Allstate in Shady Grove ballooned from what would have been 
a $500 claim in state court to a $5 million class action in New 
York federal court, Justice Scalia found that Rule 23 did not 
“enlarge” any substantive right.116 
Instead of recognizing any substantive New York state 
interest in limiting damage classes, Justice Scalia determined 
that both Rule 23 and section 901(b) were procedural 
provisions.117 He stated, “Rule 23 permits all class actions that 
meet its requirements, and a State cannot limit that 
permission by structuring one part of its statute to track Rule 
23 and enacting another part that imposes additional 
requirements.”118 Justice Scalia noted that section 901(b) does 
not simply cap statutory damages or rule out certain forms of 
damages; rather it procedurally inhibits the right to maintain a 
class action because “it prevents the class actions it covers from 
coming into existence at all.”119  
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg pursued a different 
approach. She concluded that Rule 23 and section 901(b) apply 
to different situations and therefore do not clash; in turn she 
analyzed the conflict under the unguided Erie prong rather than 
the Hanna prong. Justice Ginsburg, like the Second Circuit and 
the Eastern District of New York had held, opined that section 
  
 112 Id. at 1444. 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. at 1443. 
 115 Id. 
 116 For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s seemingly conflicting opinion on the 
substantive nature of state limitations on statutory damages, see infra Part III.D.  
 117 For a discussion of the substantive nature of class action damages, see 
infra Part III.D. 
 118 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439. 
 119 Id. 
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901(b) pertains to remedies in class actions, a substantive issue, 
whereas Rule 23 simply pertains to procedures surrounding 
class actions.120 Justice Ginsburg explained,  
Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for relief, while 
[section] 901(b) defines the dimensions of the claim itself. . . . The New 
York Legislature could have embedded the limitation in every 
provision creating a cause of action for which a penalty is authorized; 
[section] 901(b) operates as shorthand to the same effect.121  
Rather than reading section 901(b) as merely a procedural 
mechanism that adds a limitation to the provisions of Rule 23, 
Justice Ginsburg read the New York law as embodying a 
substantive state interest in limiting the crippling effect that 
class actions can have on defendants.122 By incorporating New 
York’s substantive interests into her reading, Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent falls more in line with state sovereignty 
principles prevalent in Erie jurisprudence.123 
B. The Erie Prong’s Development: The Outcome 
Determinative Test, Federalism, and the Line Between 
Substance and Procedure 
Justice Scalia saw Rule 23 as valid and procedural under 
the Rules Enabling Act, and so he held Rule 23 governed the 
issue. Because he analyzed Shady Grove under the Hanna 
prong, he did not consider the substantive interests behind New 
York’s enactment of section 901(b), which he also found to be 
procedural. However, the line between substance and procedure 
is rather “murky”;124 procedural devices often have substantive 
consequences. Indeed, states often deliberately design class 
action procedural protocols to effectuate significant substantive 
  
 120 Id. at 1465-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Rule 23 prescribes the 
considerations relevant to class certification and postcertification proceedings—but it 
does not command that a particular remedy be available when a party sues in a 
representative capacity. Section 901(b), in contrast, trains on that latter issue.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 121 Id. at 1466. 
 122 See id. at 1464-65; see also infra Part III.D (explaining how the Shady 
Grove court could have incorporated New York’s substantive interests into its reading 
of Rule 23 and section 901(b)).  
 123 See supra Part II (discussing the development of Erie jurisprudence); see 
also Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would continue to 
approach Erie questions in a manner mindful of the purposes underlying the Rules of 
Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act, faithful to precedent, and respectful of 
important state interests.”). 
 124 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (majority opinion). 
2012] SHADY GROVE 801 
interests.125 While obvious that procedural issues include 
litigation protocols and substantive law governs the merits of 
the issue litigated, it is equally obvious that procedural rules can 
yield substantive consequences on the outcome of litigation.126 
Supreme Court jurisprudence illustrates the dilemma 
surrounding this substance-versus-procedure dichotomy.  
The Supreme Court case Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,127 
decided shortly after Erie, illustrates the interplay between 
substance and procedure and offers an attempted solution to 
the problem. In this shareholder derivative suit, the Court had 
to decide whether a federal court sitting in diversity should 
apply a state statute of limitations that was shorter than the 
federal statute of limitations.128 A statute of limitations, 
arguably a procedural device, affects the time period that 
individuals have to bring suit. Therefore, application of the 
state statute would limit the plaintiffs’ ability to bring their 
cause of action.129 The Court reasoned that, for federal courts 
hearing cases solely based on diversity jurisdiction, Erie 
essentially insured that the rules used, and therefore the 
outcome that resulted, would be the same as if the relevant 
state court tried the case.130 The Court based its rationale for 
this outcome determinative test on the twin aims of Erie: the 
inequitable distribution of laws and the prevention of forum 
shopping.131 The Court explained, “[F]or the same transaction 
the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in federal court 
  
 125 Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class 
Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV., 285, 285 (2010); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1439, 1442 (2008) (“[P]rocedure is power. . . . [A]ll informed observers of the 
litigation process now understand that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and state 
class action rules, although regulating the process of litigation, can still have major 
substantive impact.”). For a discussion of state interests behind rules regarding class 
certification, see infra Part IV.A. 
 126 Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State 
Civil Procedure: The Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 
989 (2009) (“[I]t is resolving disputes through reasoned and principled deliberation, 
based on rules, that is at the heart of adjudication and . . . predefined procedures 
provide the methods for vindicating substantive rights.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 127 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 128 Id. at 100-01; see also id. at 113 n. 1 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 129 Id. at 101 (majority opinion). 
 130 Id. at 109 (“In essence, the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, 
in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the 
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court 
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a 
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”). 
 131 Id.  
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instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a 
substantially different result.”132 
The “outcome determinative” test put forth in Guaranty 
Trust is appealing because it seems simple; if the difference 
between a state and federal rule would affect the outcome of 
the case, then a federal court sitting in diversity should apply 
the state rule. However, its simplicity is also its downfall: it 
ignores the constitutional reality that the United States is a 
federal system, and federal constitutional and statutory law 
has supremacy over state law.133 The Court addressed this issue 
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,134 which 
dealt with the allocation of authority between the judge and 
jury in determining an employer’s immunity to a workmen’s 
compensation claim.135 While South Carolina law gave the judge 
the right to determine the issue of immunity,136 the Seventh 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees a jury trial in 
federal, but not state, civil actions.137 These seemingly 
procedural distinctions have both outcome-determinative and 
substantive potential consequences; juries, who are less 
knowledgeable about specific legal provisions, may be more 
sympathetic to plaintiffs than are judges. The Court explained 
that the federal judicial system ultimately is independent from 
that of the states and therefore, in certain situations, different 
rules will inevitably apply in the different courts.138 Litigants 
who properly invoke diversity jurisdiction may have their cases 
governed, in certain circumstances, by federal rules (that could 
be labeled either substantive or procedural).139  
  
 132 Id. For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II. 
 133 US CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 134 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 135 Id. at 527, 533. 
 136 Id. at 534. 
 137 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[T]he right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”). 
 138 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. For a discussion of Hanna, see supra Part II. The 
Hanna Court, like the Byrd Court, said some divergent federal and state rules were 
inevitable in the American federal system. 
 139 See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38 (“It may well be that in the instant personal-
injury case the outcome would be substantially affected by whether the issue of 
immunity is decided by a judge or a jury. Therefore, were ‘outcome’ the only 
consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that the federal court should 
follow the state practice. But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at 
work here. . . . An essential characteristic of [the federal] system is the manner in 
which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and 
jury and, under the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, 
assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.” (footnote omitted)). 
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C. Gasperini: An Illustration of the Court’s Incorporation of 
State and Federal Rules  
More recently, the Court has demonstrated that it can 
use ambiguity within a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure to allow 
a state rule limiting jury awards to coexist with the Seventh 
Amendment’s reexamination clause.140 In the 1996 diversity case 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,141 the issue concerned the 
standard of review to determine whether a new trial should be 
ordered because of excessive statutory damages. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59 (Rule 59) gives significant deference to the 
common law when designating the standard by which courts 
may grant a new trial.142 Based on the provisions of Rule 59, 
federal courts have wide discretion to use statutory or common 
law provisions in determining whether to grant a new trial. 
Indeed, one traditional reason for ordering a new trial is 
a reward of excessive damages. Gasperini took place in New 
York, and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 
5501(c)143 permitted trial and appellate courts to order a new 
trial if, upon review, the court determined a money award was 
“excessive or inadequate” by “‘deviat[ing] materially from what 
would be reasonable compensation.’”144 Before the enactment of 
section 5501(c) in 1986, New York federal and state trial judges 
“invoked the same judge-made formulation in responding to 
excessiveness attacks on jury verdicts: courts would not disturb 
an award unless the amount was so exorbitant that it shocked 
the conscience of the court.”145 Appellate courts would disturb 
the trial court’s determination regarding the jury verdict only 
where it was obvious that the trial court acted unreasonably in 
its discretion.146 However, like the South Carolina federal courts 
  
 140 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.”); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) 
(differentiating the issue in Byrd, which dealt with the Seventh Amendment’s 
guarantee of a right to a jury trial in federal civil actions, with the issue in Gasperini, 
which dealt with the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause). 
 141 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 142 For jury trials, Rule 59 permits a court to grant a new trial “for any reason 
for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A). 
 143 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 2010). 
 144 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c)); see also id. at 
425 (explaining that section 5501(c) applies to New York trial and intermediate 
appellate courts).  
 145 Id. at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146 Id. at 424 (“New York state-court opinions confirm that § 5501(c)’s ‘deviates 
materially’ standard calls for closer surveillance than ‘shock the conscience’ oversight.”). 
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in Byrd, New York federal courts sitting in diversity faced a 
dilemma.147 Section 5501(c) increased the courts’ authority to 
review jury awards,148 and in doing so, it potentially infringed 
upon the conflicting Seventh Amendment guarantee that jury 
verdicts would not be unduly re-examined.149 Rule 59 gave no 
clear guidance as to whether a federal court sitting in diversity 
should apply the state or traditional federal standard of review 
to determine whether a new trial should be ordered because of 
excessive damages; either the state or the federal rule were 
seemingly permissible.150  
Because Rule 59 granted such deference to various 
standards of review used by courts, the Gasperini Court analyzed 
the divergent standards under the unguided Erie prong and 
analyzed whether section 5501(c) was a substantive or procedural 
provision. The Court found that New York’s “material deviation” 
standard was a procedural provision with substantive 
implications.151 The standard used to determine “excessive” 
damages could greatly affect the award of damages granted to 
parties.152 In turn, this standard obviously affects litigation 
strategies, including the decision whether to litigate at all. In 
Gasperini, both parties and the Supreme Court “acknowledge[d] 
that a statutory cap on damages would supply substantive law for 
Erie purposes.”153 The Court noted that section 5501(c) did not 
specifically set a maximum recovery amount, but it did provide a 
standard by which courts could determine, through case law, if a 
damage award was “excessive.”154 The Court explained, “In sum, 
  
 147 Id. at 429-30 (“[I]f federal courts ignore the change in the New York 
standard and persist in applying the ‘shock the conscience’ test to damage awards on 
claims governed by New York law, ‘substantial variations between state and federal 
[money judgments]’ may be expected.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965)). 
 148 Id. at 422-23. 
 149 Id. at 433; see supra note 140. 
 150 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 (explaining that federal law determines the 
role of federal trial and appellate courts in reviewing jury verdicts). 
 151 Id. at 426. 
 152 Id. at 429-30. 
 153 Id. at 428. The Court quoted the Reply Brief for Petitioner:  
[T]he state as a matter of its substantive law may, among other things, 
eliminate the availability of damages for a particular claim entirely, limit the 
factors a jury may consider in determining damages, or place an absolute cap 
on the amount of damages available, and such substantive law would be 
applicable in a federal court sitting in diversity. 
Id. at 429. 
 154 Id. at 429 (concluding that section 5501(c) “differs from a statutory cap 
principally in that the maximum amount recoverable is not set forth by statute, but 
rather is determined by case law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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section 5501(c) contains a procedural instruction, . . . but [New 
York’s] objective is manifestly substantive.”155 Therefore, the Court 
had the constitutional obligation to uphold the Seventh 
Amendment, but under the Erie doctrine and the Rules of 
Decision Act, it also had the obligation to make a decision that 
respected New York’s substantive law.  
The Court went on to note that the variation in 
standards for evaluating excessive damages implicated the 
“twin aims” of Erie, because the two standards would lead to 
significantly divergent money judgments in New York state 
and federal courts.156 Nonetheless, a purely “outcome 
determinative” test was not enough to uphold a state rule over 
a federal constitutional guarantee.157 Considering all of these 
issues, the Supreme Court reasoned that the federal trial court 
judge, present for the jury trial, could ensure that the jury’s 
verdict fell within the boundaries set by state law by reviewing a 
jury’s award under the material deviation standard established 
by section 5501(c).158 However, the Seventh Amendment’s 
prohibition of improper reexamination of jury awards159 led the 
Court to hold that New York federal appellate courts could not 
apply the “material deviation” standard at the appellate stage in 
litigation where such a determination would be beyond the jury’s 
reach; rather, appellate courts could review the determination of 
the federal trial judge only when the trial judge demonstrated 
an abuse of discretion.160 Thus, the Supreme Court artfully 
incorporated the New York statutory standard of “material 
deviation” while remaining true to the Seventh Amendment.161 
By acknowledging the substantive nature of section 5501(c) and 
the ambiguity of Rule 59, the Court found a way to continue 
applying section 5501(c) in federal as well as state courts, even 
in light of a potential barrier imposed by the Constitution, the 
ultimate American legal authority. 
  
 155 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156 Id. at 430. 
 157 Id. at 432. 
 158 Id. at 418. 
 159 See id. (quoting the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause); see also 
supra note 140. 
 160 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419 (“New York’s law controlling compensation 
awards for excessiveness or inadequacy can be given effect, without detriment to the 
Seventh Amendment, if the review standard set out in CPLR § 5501(c) is applied by the 
federal trial court judge, with appellate control of the trial court’s ruling limited to 
review for abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 161 Id. at 435 (“[A]ppellate review for abuse of discretion is reconcilable with 
the Seventh Amendment as a control necessary and proper to the fair administration of 
justice . . . .”). 
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D. The Failure of the Supreme Court to Apply Gasperini’s 
Logic and Find Section 901(b)’s Substantive Aspects 
Unlike the Gasperini Court’s interpretation of section 
5501(c) as procedural with substantive implications, the Shady 
Grove plurality read section 901 to be purely procedural and 
therefore in an inevitable clash with Rule 23.162 The Shady 
Grove Court could have applied Gasperini’s logic by finding 
that section 901(b) encompassed a substantive state concern in 
order to let Rule 23 and section 901(b) coexist peacefully.163 Rule 
23 by itself does not eliminate possible roles for state law.164 
Although the national government is ultimately supreme to the 
states in the federalist system, which means that federal law 
will at times supersede state law, states still have sovereignty 
in numerous areas. Courts may interpret the federal rules 
while giving due consideration to state law.165 As Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out in the majority opinion of Gasperini, 
“Federal rule[s] appl[y] regardless of state law. Federal courts 
have interpreted the Federal Rules, however, with sensitivity 
to important state interests and regulatory policies.”166 In his 
dissent in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh, Inc.,167 Justice 
Scalia seemed to endorse precisely this type of narrow reading 
of a federal law in order to accommodate state interests.168 He 
stated, 
  
 162 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1439 (2010) (stating that section 901(b) “undeniably answer[s] the same question as 
Rule 23: whether a class action may proceed for a given suit”). 
 163 See Watkins, supra note 125, at 297 (“Gasperini is properly read as general 
command for federal courts to let state policies color their interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure—even when prior interpretations seem to be controlling 
authority. And this command applies even more strongly when the Rule at issue is 
general and permissive in nature.”). 
 164 See Steinman, supra note 22, at 1144 (“Shady Grove’s holding that Rule 23 
applies to class-certification decisions does not foreclose the possibility that state law 
can play a role in Rule 23’s application.”). 
 165 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 166 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7 (citations omitted); see also Shady Grove, 
130 S. Ct. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 167 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 168 The issue in Stewart involved a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a) and not a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Id. at 28. However, Scalia’s 
inclination to read a congressional statute narrowly and a federal rule broadly is odd, 
considering the separation of powers concerns involved in promulgating the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 16, at 43-44 (“[I]t is 
reasonable to impute to Congress a concern for protecting state lawmaking choices that 
affect state substantive rights, since that body often invokes federalism as warranting 
solicitude for state prerogatives. But that is a secondary consequence of the Enabling 
Act’s primary concern, which is preventing the Supreme Court, exercising delegated 
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[T]here is nothing unusual about having the applicability of a federal 
statute depend on the content of state law. We have recognized that 
precisely this is required when the application of the federal statute 
depends, as here, on resolution of an underlying issue that is 
fundamentally one of state law.169  
Further, Rule 23’s very terms do not set a bright-line 
procedural rule. Rather, Rule 23 illustrates the vague line 
between (1) substance and procedure and (2) statutory law and 
common law.170 For instance, Rule 23(a) mandates that before a 
class may be certified, it must satisfy all four of the following 
requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation.171 As an additional requirement of 
certification, a class must satisfy one of the requirements of 
Rule 23(b). The plaintiffs in Shady Grove relied on Rule 
23(b)(3), which specifically states, “[Q]uestions of law or fact 
common to class members [must] predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”172 Obviously, words 
such as predominate and superior do not offer a map to neat 
and explicitly clear determinations.173 Indeed, the Rule 23 
guidelines for class certification do not offer a clear-cut set of 
instructions in themselves—the instructions are rather based 
on case law.174 Therefore, as Professor Adam Steinman explains, 
  
legislative power to promulgate court rules, from encroaching upon Congress’s 
lawmaking prerogatives.”). 
 169 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 35 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170 Likewise, Rule 59’s standard for granting a new trial and the Seventh 
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause, both at issue in Gasperini, also illustrates these 
ambiguities. 
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see also 
Steinman, supra note 22, at 1144 (“Rule 23(a) mandates that all class actions must 
satisfy four elements: ‘numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation.’” (quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437)). 
 172 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Steinman, supra note 22, at 1144-45 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
 173 Steinman, supra note 22, at 1145 (“No precise formula is provided for how 
a court should measure whether common issues ‘predominate,’ or how a court should 
balance the costs and benefits of class treatment to decide whether a class action would 
be ‘superior.’”). For a list of factors in Rule 23 that courts use in the superiority 
analysis, see supra note 9; Steinman, supra note 22, at 1145 n.78 (“Rule 23 does 
provide a non-exhaustive list of factors that are ‘pertinent’ to the superiority 
inquiry . . . . [However], these factors do not foreclose the incorporation of state law into 
the superiority analysis.”). 
 174 Steinman, supra note 22, at 1145 (explaining that the federal courts place 
a “judicial gloss” upon class action certification that dictates over the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
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[T]here is a difference between state law conflicting with a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure (which triggers the REA’s “substantive 
rights” standard) and state law conflicting with the federal 
judiciary’s gloss on a Federal Rule whose text provides only a vague 
or ambiguous standard (which triggers the more state-friendly “twin 
aims” standard). If the vague standard set forth in the Federal Rule 
can be applied in a way that is consistent with state law, then the 
Federal Rule does not truly collide with state law.175  
By ignoring this important point, the Shady Grove 
decision precluded New York from legislating in a substantive 
area. In Gasperini, New York law guided the court to 
determine the standard for excessive damages as a means of 
granting a new trial under Rule 59 in light of section 5501(c) 
and the Seventh Amendment. The same application of state 
law could have been used in Shady Grove: section 901(b) could 
have led the court to determine that class action was not a 
superior means of pursuing a claim under Rule 23.176 The Shady 
Grove plaintiffs relied upon the superiority requirement of Rule 
23(b), and it is this provision that opens an area for state law.177 
New York, or other state law,178 could inform the court’s 
decision on whether class action would be “superior” to 
individual actions.179 Just as the Gasperini court determined 
that a state law could inform Rule 59 and the Seventh 
Amendment, the Shady Grove Court could have determined 
  
 175 Id. at 1145-46; see also Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration 
Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1082 (2011) (“The 
important point remains that, even without a bar on class certification for statutory 
damages, the terms of Rule 23 make class certification far from a sure thing.”); Patrick 
Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 
1743 (2006) (stating that the denying certification based on the “superiority” provision of 
Rule 23(b) “rests on the premise that federal courts should allow the substantive 
law . . . to be developed state-by-state rather than using the law of the forum to resolve all 
the claims”); York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1809 (“[S]uperiority analysis under Rule 23(b) 
should not turn primarily on conservation of judicial resources.”). 
 176 See Steinman, supra note 22, at 1147 (“How federal courts . . . decide 
whether a class action would be ‘superior’ in any given case is not dictated by Rule 23 
itself. For a state-law claim . . . state law might inform whether class treatment is 
superior for class-certification purposes . . . .”). 
 177 Nagareda, supra note 175, at 1075; see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of 
Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 46-47 (Univ. of 
Penn. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-28), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665092 (“With statutes, judges apply the law but 
do not make it. . . . With judge-made law, however, they make the law and are free to 
make the priority decision on their own. . . . Without legislative guidance, the priority 
determination is a policy decision, and unsurprisingly judges have been guided by policy-
Erie in deciding the extent to which their judge-made rules should displace otherwise-
applicable state law. That is exactly the reasoning we see in Walker and Gasperini.”). 
 178 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 22, at 1147 (“This logic would also apply 
when (unlike in Shady Grove) state law is more permissive of class actions.”). 
 179 Id. at 1146-47. 
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that New York law spoke directly to the “superiority” 
requirement of Rule 23(b), particularly in light of the fact that 
Rule 23(a) and 23(b) both state that a class action “may” (not 
“must”) be maintained upon meeting certain requirements.180  
Justice Ginsburg drew attention to this flaw in Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning. Section 901(b), like section 5501(c) at issue 
in Gasperini, was a procedural mechanism with substantive 
objectives. Justice Ginsburg stated,  
Rule 23 authorizes class treatment for suits satisfying its 
prerequisites because the class mechanism generally affords a fair 
and efficient way to aggregate claims for adjudication. Section 901(b) 
responds to an entirely different concern; it does not allow class 
members to recover statutory damages because the New York 
Legislature considered the result of adjudicating such claims en 
masse to be exorbitant. The fair and efficient conduct of class 
litigation is the legitimate concern of Rule 23; the remedy for an 
infraction of state law, however, is the legitimate concern of the 
State’s lawmakers and not of the federal rulemakers.181 
Justice Ginsburg further explained the theoretical and 
constitutional problems behind Justice Scalia’s formalistic 
approach to the facts of Shady Grove. She noted that even under 
the Hanna prong, Justice Scalia’s interpretation failed to uphold 
the provisions of the Rules Enabling Act that prohibit federal 
rules from “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] state 
substantive rights.”182 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg invoked the 
limitations imposed on the national government by the system of 
federalism and on the judiciary by the separation of powers. She 
stated, “[Justice Scalia’s interpretation] ignores the balance that 
Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and 
respect for a State’s construction of its own rights and remedies. 
It also ignores the separation-of-powers presumption and 
federalism presumption that counsel against judicially created 
rules displacing state substantive law.”183 Although Congress 
delegated the power to write the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to the judiciary, Justice Ginsburg duly noted, as did 
  
 180 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 181 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1466 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also id. (“It is relevant 
‘whether the state provision embodies a substantive policy or represents only a 
procedural disagreement with the federal rulemakers respecting the fairest and most 
efficient way of conducting litigation.’” (quoting Ely, supra note 55, at 722)).  
 182 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 183 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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the Erie Court, that the Court did not have the authority to 
make substantive law that could overcome state legislation.184 
Justice Ginsburg identified section 901(b) as 
substantive rather than procedural by examining its legislative 
history. She wrote, 
[S]uits seeking statutory damages are arguably best suited to the 
class device because individual proof of actual damages is 
unnecessary. New York’s decision instead to block class-action 
proceedings for statutory damages therefore makes scant sense, except 
as a means to a manifestly substantive end: Limiting a defendant’s 
liability in a single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant 
inflation of penalties-remedies the New York Legislature created 
with individual suits in mind.185 
The nature of damages in class actions renders them 
inherently substantive. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that 
statutory damages pose a particularly unique problem for 
defendants in class actions: “When representative plaintiffs 
seek statutory damages, pressure to settle may be heightened 
because a class action poses the risk of massive liability 
unmoored to actual injury.”186 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s 
formalistic reading of the procedural aspects of Rule 23 ignores 
the substantive realities of class actions, which states intend to 
regulate through various rules.187 For example, Justice Scalia 
failed to acknowledge “the monumental pressure that class 
certification imposes on defendants to settle—a dominant 
factor in the practical dynamics of class litigation—or the 
decades of efforts by courts . . . to shape class action practice to 
avoid compromising important policies bound up in the 
substantive law.”188 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg pointed out 
that in Gasperini, both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia 
indicated that statutory damages were indeed a substantive, 
rather than a procedural issue.189 In Gasperini, Justice Stevens 
stated, “A state-law ceiling on allowable damages . . . is a 
substantive rule of decision that federal courts must apply in 
  
 184 For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II. 
 185 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added); see also id. 1465 n.3 (“[A] class action can result in ‘potentially ruinous 
liability.’ A court’s decision to certify a class accordingly places pressure on the 
defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims.” (citation omitted)). 
 186 Id. at 1465 n.3. 
 187 Watkins, supra note 125, at 285-86. 
 188 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 16, at 65 (footnote omitted). For a discussion 
of CAFA’s legislative history and purpose, see infra Part IV.A. 
 189 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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diversity cases governed by New York law.”190 Justice Scalia 
wrote, “State substantive law controls what injuries are 
compensable and in what amount.”191 Justice Scalia and Justice 
Stevens’s broad, inherently procedural reading of Rule 23 in 
Shady Grove contradicts both the ambiguity surrounding the 
“superiority” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)192 and their former 
analysis regarding the substantive state interest in 
determining limitations on damages.193 
Despite significant precedent that called for 
accommodating state interests and that defines statutory 
damages as a substantive state interest, the plurality opinion in 
Shady Grove misappropriated precedent in the Erie choice-of-
law cases—including Gasperini—and stopped short of finding 
section 901(b) a substantive provision.194 Even though New York 
tried to prohibit cases such as Shady Grove from proceeding as 
class actions through section 901(b), the Supreme Court 
permitted it to proceed in federal court under Rule 23. The 
Court’s decision in Shady Grove is problematic in its 
consequences as well as in its misapplication of precedent. First, 
it violates the twin aims of Erie because it will increase forum 
shopping and the inequitable distribution of the laws.195 With the 
Shady Grove decision, the Supreme Court made it easier to 
pursue a class action in federal court sitting in diversity than in 
the state court of New York, whose legislature created the cause 
of action. Further, the Court’s decision perverted the legislative 
intent behind CAFA, which sought to establish federal 
jurisdiction to protect defendants in states with laws favoring 
plaintiffs in pursuing nationwide class actions.196 
IV. SOLUTION: AMEND CAFA TO PREVENT SIMILAR 
MISTAKES AND TO UPHOLD STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
The Shady Grove plurality treated the issue of class 
actions, sui generis, as solely that of a clash between Rule 23 
and section 901(b). However, the opinion peculiarly ignores 
  
 190 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 439-40 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 191 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Shady Grove, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 192 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For the full text of Rule 23, see supra note 9. 
 193 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.  
 194 For a discussion of Scalia’s interpretation of section 901(b) as procedural, 
see supra Part III.A. 
 195 For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II. 
 196 For a discussion of CAFA’s legislative history and purpose, see infra Part IV.A. 
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CAFA, the law that allowed the case to proceed in federal court 
in the first place. While the interest owed to Shady Grove was 
only about $500, Shady Grove was able to pursue its claim in 
New York federal court as a class action under CAFA’s 
provision that permits claims to be brought in federal courts as 
long as minimum diversity is met, the class contains at least 
one hundred members, and the amount in controversy 
aggregates to at least $5 million.197 Although Congress enacted 
CAFA to curb abusive practices pursued by some plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in class-action friendly states, the Shady Grove 
decision completely undermines both the legislative intent 
behind CAFA and the federalism principles embodied in the 
“twin aims” of Erie. Therefore, Congress should amend CAFA 
(which already contains several carve-outs that incorporate 
considerations of local interests) in order to ensure that any 
class action brought in federal court could also be maintained 
in the forum’s state courts. 
A. CAFA Legislative History 
Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 in “response to the 
perceived evils of damage class actions run amok.”198 Between 
the 1970s and 1990s, plaintiffs increasingly sued corporate 
defendants for damages,199 and class actions increased in both 
federal and state courts as “[b]road rules of personal 
jurisdiction allowed plaintiffs to sue most national corporations 
in state or federal court anywhere in the country. In these early 
years, many judges—both state and federal—favored the 
damage class as a useful mechanism for resolving mass torts 
and consumer claims.”200 By the 1990s, however, state and 
federal courts began to hand down different results, even 
though they both applied the same choice-of-law rules.201 While 
federal courts increasingly began to move away from 
nationwide damage class certification, some state courts 
became more open to class action certification requests.202 Thus, 
the decisions issued by federal courts created significant 
  
 197 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). 
 198 York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1802. 
 199 See id. at 1830 n.1 (“Damage classes seek primarily money damages, 
rather than injunctive relief, under Rule 23(b)(3).” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 200 Id. at 1802 (footnote omitted). 
 201 Id.  
 202 Id. 
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precedent disfavoring nationwide classes.203 In turn, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys began to file nationwide class actions in state courts, 
obviously shopping for the states that had the friendliest 
certification rules and laws supportive of plaintiffs.204  
Federal legislators saw the numerous abuses in state 
courts that result from divergent state rules regarding damage-
class certification.205 States with pro-plaintiff rules and laws 
were creating precedent in nationwide class actions that bound 
other states, thus creating federalism concerns by interfering 
with the sovereignty of other states.206 Through plaintiff-
friendly class action laws, some states had rules that led to bias 
against out-of-state defendants.207 Further, certification of a 
damage class leads defendants to settle,208 which in turn yields 
  
 203 See id.  
 204 Id. at 1803; see also Burbank, supra note 125, at 1508 (“[F]or a time at 
least, some plaintiff class action lawyers were successful in securing certifications in 
multistate class actions that could not have been certified under developing federal 
class action jurisprudence.”); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of 
Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2376 (2008) (“Litigant use of 
procedure to obtain perceived tactical advantage is most familiar in the much-maligned 
practice of ‘forum shopping.’ Strategic choice of forum is utilized by both plaintiffs and 
defendants. Plaintiffs choose to file their complaint in the forum they think will be 
most hospitable.” (footnote omitted)); Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law in National 
Class Actions: Should CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54, 55 
(2009) (“Interstate forum-shopping in class action litigation has occurred for various 
reasons—most notably a group of ‘magnet’ state courts that became attractive to 
plaintiffs’ lawyers because of the ease of obtaining certification of a nationwide class.”).  
 205 Silberman, supra note 204, at 56-57 (“The premise underlying CAFA is 
that the federal courts will be less biased and parochial than the state courts have been 
with respect to the certification of ‘nationwide’ classes.”). 
 206 See Cabraser, supra note 51, § 9:28(a)(4) (explaining the federalism 
concerns that gave rise to CAFA’s enactment, including the fact that some states were 
keeping class actions dealing with national interests out of federal court, some state 
laws exhibited prejudice against out-of-state defendants, and states were making 
decisions that bound other states); see also Burbank, supra note 125, at 1511 (“In [an] 
increasingly entrepreneurial and competitive environment . . . a state court class action 
[that] was settled first [could have] preclusive effect.”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An 
Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1733 (2008) 
(“Congress explicitly found that abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial 
system because State and local courts are keeping cases of national importance out of 
Federal court and making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States 
and bind the rights of the residents of those States.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Silberman, supra note 204, at 66 (“[T]he Senate Report on CAFA noted the 
trend toward nationwide class actions, which invite one state court to dictate to 49 
others what their laws should be on a particular issue, thereby undermining basic 
federalism principles.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Woolley, supra note 175, at 
1726 (“The legislative history of CAFA purports to document a number of state court 
abuses with respect to class suits, including state decisions applying the law of one 
state to claims in nationwide class suits.” (footnote omitted)). 
 207 Roosevelt III, supra note 177, at 53 (citing CAFA § 2(a)(2)). 
 208 Silberman, supra note 204, at 63 (“[I]t is universally acknowledged that 
certification of a class is often the catalyst for settlement.”). 
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enormous rewards to plaintiffs’ attorneys.209 Because class 
actions often lead defendants to settle, plaintiffs’ lawyers used 
this tactic and pursued a strategy of forum shopping to benefit 
themselves.210 To address this abusive strategy by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, CAFA allows defendants to remove class actions to 
federal court in order to prevent plaintiffs from horizontal 
forum shopping as a means of pursuing class actions in 
plaintiff-friendly state jurisdictions.211  
  
 209 For Justice Ginsburg’s argument that the pressure put on defendants to 
settle in class actions is a substantive area of state concern, see supra Part III.D; see 
also Cabraser, supra note 51, § 9:28(a)(3) (stating that one of the reasons Congress 
enacted CAFA was to correct the harm or lack of benefit that class members often 
experience in light of the large fees granted to attorneys and to some plaintiffs at the 
expense of others); Lee & Willging, supra note 206, at 1734 (“A 2003 . . . survey of 
attorneys in recently terminated class actions yielded a finding that the median 
recovery in class action settlements was $800,000 and that 75% of the settlements were 
valued at less than $5.2 million.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis 
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1991) (“Over the past 
decade a number of scholars . . . have recognized that the single most salient 
characteristic of class . . . litigation is the existence of ‘entrepreneurial’ plaintiffs’ 
attorneys. Because these attorneys are not subject to monitoring by their putative 
clients, they operate largely according to their own self-interest, subject only to 
whatever constraints might be imposed by bar discipline, judicial oversight, and their 
own sense of ethics and fiduciary responsibilities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 210 Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the 
Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 98 (2009) (“CAFA was intended to respond to perceived abuses 
in class action practice, specifically to the perceptions that plaintiffs engage in forum 
shopping and that too many class action settlements are approved in which substantial 
fees are granted to the plaintiff lawyers at the expense of the plaintiffs.”); see also 
Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 
1593-94 (2008) (“CAFA, like every other major class action development of recent years, 
was born amidst snide remarks about lawyers’ inventing lawsuits and manipulating 
the system to enrich themselves at others’ expense. Politicians and other CAFA 
proponents called class action lawyers self-interested, unscrupulous, unprincipled, and 
unaccountable.” (footnotes omitted)); Silberman, supra note 204, at 55 (“Interstate 
forum-shopping in class action litigation has occurred for various reasons—most 
notably a group of ‘magnet’ state courts that became attractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers 
because of the ease of obtaining certification of a nationwide class.”); Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2008) (“As has been extensively analyzed, aggregate 
litigation can create a serious misalignment between the interests of class counsel and 
the interests of the absentees they represent, a mismatch that in turn can lead class 
counsel to sacrifice the welfare of the class in return for personal gain.”).  
 211 Silberman, supra note 204, at 56-57. For a discussion of vertical forum 
shopping, see supra Part II. CAFA’s purpose, to prevent horizontal forum shopping, 
differs from the goal to prevent vertical forum shopping as espoused by the twin aims of 
Erie. Horizontal forum shopping occurs when plaintiffs choose to pursue claims in a 
particular state that is known for plaintiff-friendly laws. Vertical forum shopping, which 
the twin aims of Erie sought to prevent, occurs when plaintiffs choose to pursue claims in 
federal court over state court because of friendlier federal laws. See supra note 60. 
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CAFA indicates that class actions invoke substantive 
concerns.212 CAFA includes “a litany of complaints about alleged 
‘abuses of the class action device’ that have ‘harmed class 
members with legitimate claims and defendants that have 
acted responsibly; adversely affected interstate commerce; and 
undermined public respect for our judicial system.’”213 CAFA 
emphasizes that federal courts are the appropriate venue for 
“interstate cases of national importance under diversity 
jurisdiction.”214 Thus, CAFA targets multistate or nationwide 
class actions, where choice-of-law issues can be complex, and 
the state law often applied would have a preclusive effect, 
superseding the applicable laws of other states.215 This effect 
creates a particular problem when “[t]he court might . . . decide 
that a single state’s law should govern the entire action when, 
had the claims been brought individually, it would have 
decided them under multiple different laws.”216 While it may 
address some of these issues, CAFA can be seen as 
overinclusive, because “it applies to all state courts, not just 
problem jurisdictions. Furthermore, it applies to all class 
actions, not merely to duplicative state and federal class 
actions. . . . In short, CAFA is directed toward every class 
action, not just those circumstances in which problems have 
been identified.”217 Shady Grove exemplifies the overinclusive 
problem inherent in CAFA. Shady Grove did not involve 
multistate litigation, and the limitations on damages set by 
section 901(b) demonstrate that New York did not have 
particularly plaintiff-friendly class action laws. 
Shady Grove presents a unique problem seemingly not 
contemplated by the drafters of CAFA. The issue in Shady 
  
 212 Burbank, supra note 125, at 1442 (“Even if [class action] rules do not 
change substantive law directly, they can change the practical enforcement of 
substantive rights, whether by enabling plaintiffs to sue who would not otherwise be 
able to do so, or by exercising irresistible pressure on defendants to settle cases that 
they regard as lacking in merit.”); Watkins, supra note 125, at 287 (“The class action 
defies easy classification under the traditional substance-procedure divide. . . . Like 
statutes of limitations, pleading standards, and other rules of a procedural flavor, class 
actions have always served purposes beyond docket control.”). 
 213 Roosevelt III, supra note 177, at 52-53 (quoting CAFA § 2(a)(2)). 
 214 Id. at 53 (quoting CAFA § 2(a)(2)). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 54. For Justice Scalia’s assertion that class actions do not alter legal 
rights but simply offer a means of joinder, see supra Part III.A. Justice Scalia’s 
contention conflicts with the reality of the problems inherent in choice of law decisions 
and federalism concerns that arise in nationwide class actions. 
 217 Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One Mess to Create Another: Duplicative Class 
Actions, Federal Courts’ Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 29 
HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 255 (2006) (footnote omitted).  
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Grove involved a straightforward state claim with substantive 
limitations set by the New York legislature.218 Therefore, the 
Eastern District of New York and the Second Circuit both 
logically concluded that section 901(b) governed the issue and 
prevented Shady Grove from pursuing its claim as a class 
action. Of course, Shady Grove was still free to pursue its 
individual claim for $500 against Allstate in New York state 
court.219 Justice Ginsburg wrote, “Congress surely never 
anticipated that CAFA would make federal courts a mecca for 
suits of the kind Shady Grove has launched: class actions 
seeking state-created penalties for claims arising under state 
law-claims that would be barred from class treatment in the 
State’s own courts.”220 In effect, CAFA has “prevent[ed] states 
from interpreting and effectuating their laws through their 
own courts, thus interfering considerably with their 
sovereignty.”221 The Supreme Court’s rigid reading of the “clash” 
between Rule 23 and section 901(b) perverts the legislative 
intent behind CAFA, the very provision that gave the Shady 
Grove plaintiffs the option of pursuing their claim in federal 
court.222 Moreover, it permits the federal government to 
supersede a state law, even though the cause of action arose 
under state law, thus significantly infringing upon state 
authority as granted in the constitutional system of federalism 
under the Tenth Amendment. 
B. The Twin Aims of Erie Weigh in Favor of Section 901(b) 
Over Rule 23 
When deciding an Erie choice-of-law case, the crucial 
threshold question—whether to analyze the case under the 
  
 218 For a discussion of Shady Grove’s background and facts, see supra Part I. 
 219 See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 175, at 1070-71 (“Insofar as legislative 
materials reveal, the notion behind § 901(b) is to avoid remedial overkill—the addition 
of class treatment to a remedy already designed to provide an aggrieved party with a 
sufficient incentive to pursue a claim, so as to generate a whopping level of potential 
liability in the aggregate.” (citation omitted)).  
 220 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1473 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 221 Kerr, supra note 217, at 256; see also Justin D. Forlenza, CAFA and Erie: 
Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2006) (“CAFA’s 
practical effect will be to usurp the state judiciary’s primary role of creating and 
developing the substantive law in those areas. Thus, the statute will force federal 
courts to create and develop substantive federal common law.”). 
 222 For an explanation of the problems created by plaintiffs who use horizontal 
forum shopping to pursue class actions, see supra Part IV.A. CAFA did not target states 
like New York that attempted to restrict plaintiffs’ abilities to pursue class actions. 
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Hanna prong or the unguided Erie prong—substantially affects 
the outcome of the decision, as exemplified by Shady Grove.223 By 
analyzing the issue under the Hanna prong, the Court favored 
the application of federal law, particularly because the Court 
has never invalidated a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.224 On 
the other hand, if the Court had followed the unguided Erie 
prong, like Justice Ginsburg, it most likely would have 
permitted Rule 23 and section 901(b) to coexist and would have 
applied the state rule in order to uphold the twin aims of Erie.225 
“If the choice between federal and state class-action law had 
been categorized as an unguided Erie choice, then Shady Grove 
would have been a 9-0 decision that federal class-action 
standards must yield to New York’s section 901(b).”226  
All nine justices pointed out that the Shady Grove decision 
would encourage vertical forum shopping, a violation of the “twin 
aims” of Erie.227 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia stated, “The short of 
the matter is that a federal rule governing procedure is valid 
whether or not it alters the outcome of the case in a way that 
induces forum shopping.”228 Further, Justice Scalia wrote, 
[Forum shopping] is unacceptable when it comes as the consequence 
of judge-made rules created to fill supposed gaps in positive federal 
law. For where neither the Constitution, a treaty, nor a statute 
provides the rule of decision or authorizes a federal court to supply 
one, state must govern because there can be no other law. But 
divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of forum 
shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) 
result of a uniform system of federal procedure.229 
  
 223 See Steinman, supra note 22, at 1143 (“Shady Grove confirms how crucial 
Erie’s threshold question can be.”). 
 224 For a discussion of the Court’s resistance to invalidating a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure, see supra Parts II & III.A. 
 225 For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra notes 53-62 and 
accompanying text. 
 226 Steinman, supra note 22, at 1143. 
 227 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1447 (2010) (“We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-court door open 
to class actions that cannot proceed in state court will produce forum shopping.”); id. at 
1459 (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that class certification “is relevant to the 
forum shopping considerations that are part of the Rules of Decision Act or Erie inquiry”); 
id. at 1471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the plurality acknowledges, forum shopping 
will undoubtedly result if a plaintiff need only file in federal instead of state court to seek 
a massive monetary award explicitly barred by state law.” (citation omitted)). 
 228 Id. at 1448 (citations omitted) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 
473-74 (1965)). 
 229 Id. at 1447-48 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a 
discussion of Hanna’s acceptance of forum shopping as somewhat inevitable in a 
federal system, see supra Part II. 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens put forward a 
similar argument, noting that forum shopping considerations 
would concern the court only if a relevant federal rule did not 
govern the case.230 Stevens wrote, “As the Court explained in 
Hanna, it is an incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins constitutes the appropriate test of the 
applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.”231 
While Justices Scalia and Stevens correctly stated that 
vertical forum shopping is an inevitable consequence in a 
supremacy federalist system, their decision in Shady Grove to 
read Rule 23 as directly colliding with section 901(b) precluded 
the justices from drawing any other conclusion, even though 
the Eastern District of New York and the Second Circuit did 
not see such a conflict. If the Supreme Court had instead 
chosen to read Rule 23 and section 901(b) as coextensive, then 
it would have been compelled to favor the application of section 
901(b) in this case because the case arises under and is limited 
by state laws and rules. Just as they ignored the legislative 
intent behind CAFA,232 the plurality in Shady Grove ignored 
New York’s substantive state interests behind section 901(b).233 
By doing so, they made bypass of New York’s rules easier for 
out-of-state plaintiffs through the exploitation of diversity 
jurisdiction. The Shady Grove decision gave non–New York 
citizen plaintiffs an advantage that New York citizen-plaintiffs 
would not have in a similar case arising under New York law 
against a New York defendant. In turn, this ability of non-
citizen plaintiffs to vertically forum shop also creates an 
inequitable distribution of laws in violation of the second aim of 
Erie.234 Thus, the Shady Grove decision turned the purposes of 
both CAFA and Erie on their heads. 235 
C. Adding a “Shady Grove Carve-Out” to CAFA 
While CAFA permits any defendant to remove a case to 
federal court where the amount in controversy is at least $5 
  
 230 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 231 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 232 For a discussion of CAFA’s legislative intent, see supra Part IV.A. 
 233 For a discussion of New York’s substantive interest behind section 901(b), 
see supra Part III.D. 
 234 See supra Part II. 
 235 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Congress 
envisioned fewer—not more—class actions overall [by enacting CAFA]. . . . The policy 
of Erie precludes maintenance in federal court of suits to which the State has closed its 
courts.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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million, there are at least 100 class members, and minimum 
diversity is met,236 CAFA also contains several exceptions to 
obtaining federal jurisdiction. “Under CAFA, whether federal 
jurisdiction is appropriate for class actions brought in the state 
where all the primary defendants reside depends upon the 
citizenship of the plaintiff class.”237 First, federal courts do not 
have jurisdiction when at least two-thirds (aggregated) of the 
plaintiffs and all primary defendants are citizens of the forum 
state.238 When between one-third and two-thirds of class 
members are citizens of the forum state, federal courts may 
decline to exercise jurisdiction, based on six factors: (1) 
interstate or national interest; (2) whether the claims are under 
forum state law; (3) whether the claims have been artfully pled 
in order to avoid federal court; (4) whether the forum state has 
a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or 
the defendants; (5) whether plaintiff citizenship in the 
aggregate points to the forum state rather than another state; 
and (6) whether any other class actions asserting the same or 
similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been 
filed in the preceding three years.239 Additionally,  
[T]he local controversy exception applies to claims that are unique to the 
state where the action is filed. If more than two-thirds of the class 
plaintiffs are citizens of the forum state, the court’s focus will shift to the 
defendant and the conduct alleged. In order for this exception to apply, 
at least one defendant from whom significant relief is sought, and whose 
alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the 
proposed plaintiff class must be a citizen of the forum state.240 
Because CAFA already has a number of carve-outs, 
including ones that particularly take local controversies into 
account, Congress should amend it to include an additional 
carve-out that will avoid a further extension of Shady Grove. 
Congress could simply add an exception that states, as 
suggested by Justice Ginsburg, that federal courts sitting in 
diversity do not have jurisdiction over “claims that could not be 
maintained as a class action in [the relevant] state court.”241 
Thus, the integrity of CAFA’s purpose would be preserved. 
  
 236 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 237 Ellis, supra note 210, at 101 (footnote omitted). 
 238 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2006). 
 239 Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F) (emphasis added). 
 240 Ellis, supra note 210, at 102 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 241 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1473 n.15 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
820 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
Federal courts would continue to have jurisdiction in multistate 
class actions, which is an obvious area of federal concern, given 
the issue’s substantial interstate-commerce questions.242 Federal 
courts would still also have the opportunity, through defendants’ 
removal motions, to prevent state courts from handing down 
opinions that potentially bind other states.243 The carve-out 
would continue to protect defendants and plaintiffs from 
plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to enrich themselves at the expense 
of the parties. Additionally, such an amendment would improve 
CAFA by upholding state sovereignty, particularly where, as in 
Shady Grove, both the cause of action and limitations on that 
cause of action are products of state law.244 This is an important 
feature of the proposed amendment, because it respects the 
limitations on federal power and the rights of states 
characteristic of our federal system.245 Further, it respects 
regional differences and local issues by allowing states to create 
their own rules as they see fit.246  
Finally, by furthering such federalism, this amendment 
would also stay true to the “twin aims of Erie.”247 Parties could 
no longer seek a forum based on the divergence between 
federal and state rules that could lead to markedly different 
outcomes when litigating under a state-created right of action. 
Thus, the carve-out would increase equity between plaintiffs 
and defendants and between out-of-state and in-state parties. 
Equitable distribution of the laws and a discouragement of 
forum shopping increase the uniformity of applicable laws, 
which in turn makes laws more stable.  
By narrowly carving out CAFA to prevent class actions 
from proceeding in federal court if they could not be 
  
 242 Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1765, 1807 (2008) (“[I]t may . . . [be] justified as a matter of jurisdictional 
policy to define the exceptions to federal court jurisdiction very narrowly so as to 
ensure that [CAFA] jurisdiction reaches all cases that are truly multistate.”). 
 243 See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 244 Watkins, supra note 125, at 296 (“Since class actions have special 
connections to substantive rights, federal courts—already sensitive to substantive 
rights in interpretation of federal rules—should give class action policies special 
solicitude; and in deciding questions of certification, they should look to the 
certification law of the state whose substantive law provides the cause of action.”). 
 245 Silberman, supra note 204, at 63 (“[U]sing aggregation to alter choice of 
law . . . . ignores the question of what rights the parties have in the first place and it 
undermines the underlying structure of federalism in the United States where the 
individual states set the appropriate standards of responsibility and compensation in a 
particular area.”). 
 246 For a discussion of the Erie doctrine and its relationship to federalism, see 
supra Part II. 
 247 For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II. 
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maintained in state court, Congress could prevent future 
misapplication of Erie choice-of-law cases in class actions that 
have federal jurisdiction under CAFA but arise under state 
law. While the Shady Grove plurality seems rightly concerned 
with preserving the integrity of the Rules Enabling Act, 
legitimizing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
promoting the uniformity of rules and efficiency in federal 
courts,248 a CAFA carve-out remains true to all of these 
interests, because Rule 23 would not change. Further, this 
limited restriction on CAFA’s reach does not create confusion 
in forcing courts to overly accommodate state rules.249 Quite 
simply, a legislative amendment would mean that when 
deciding class actions arising solely under state law, courts 
would not have to debate whether a federal provision is in 
direct collision with a state rule and whether they should 
follow the Hanna or unguided Erie prong.250 They would not 
have to determine whether the provision at issue is substantive 
or procedural: the carve-out itself would acknowledge the 
substantive concerns invoked by the class action mechanism.251 
Instead of being dragged into “Erie’s murky waters,”252 federal 
courts sitting in diversity would simply look to relevant state 
law in determining class certification. Thus, the proposed 
CAFA carve-out simplifies choice of law issues for federal 
courts sitting in diversity and upholds numerous interests 
within our system of government, including the legislative 
purpose behind CAFA—seeking to protect the system of 
  
 248 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1442 (2010) (“What the dissent’s approach achieves is . . . the invalidation of Rule 23 
(pursuant to section 2072(b) of the Rules Enabling Act) to the extent that it conflicts 
with the substantive policies of section 901.”); id. at 1444 (noting that the substantive 
or procedural effect of a federal rule of civil procedure is not the issue in determining its 
validity; rather, the issue is whether the rule in itself is procedural); see also Kevin M. 
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 1017-18 
(2011) (noting that efficiency is served by a uniform system of federal rules that may 
always be redrafted based on facial challenges rather than as-applied challenges). 
 249 For criticisms of the type of confusing balancing tests and over-deference to 
state courts seemingly advocated by Gasperini and Byrd, see generally Clermont, supra 
note 248; Richard D. Freer & Thomas Arthur, The Irrepressible Myth of Byrd, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 61 (2010); Armando Gustavo Hernandez, The Head-on Collision of 
Gasperini and the Derailment of Erie: Exposing the Futility of the Accommodation 
Doctrine, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191 (2010); John B. Oakley, Illuminating Shady Grove: 
A General Approach to Resolving Erie Problems, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 79 (2010). 
 250 For a discussion of the development of Erie jurisprudence, see supra Part II. 
 251 For a discussion of the substantive interests underlying class actions, see 
supra Parts III.D and IV.A. 
 252 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
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federalism—which is inherently implicated in choice-of-law 
decisions arising under diversity jurisdiction.253  
CONCLUSION 
Based on the controversial 2010 decision in Shady 
Grove, Congress should amend CAFA. The parties in Shady 
Grove were in federal court only because of CAFA’s provision 
granting federal jurisdiction where the amount in controversy 
exceeds $5 million and minimal diversity is met, despite the 
fact that plaintiffs were pursuing a cause of action created 
under and limited by New York law. If Congress amended 
CAFA to deny federal jurisdiction to class actions that could 
not be maintained in the state under whose laws the cause of 
action at issue arose, then it could uphold the purpose of CAFA 
while at the same time respecting the ability of states to 
legislate about the substantive issues underlying the use of 
class actions as a procedural mechanism. This amendment 
would preserve the system of federalism and respect various 
precedents acknowledging the substantive nature of statutory 
damage limitations. Such a division of power enhances the 
government’s ability to address the interests of all of its 
citizens and maintains the respective realms of sovereignty.  
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 253 Silberman, supra note 204, at 66 (“[T]he Senate Report on CAFA noted the 
trend toward nationwide class actions, which invite one state court to dictate to 49 
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